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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
conducted today embraces integrated operations in many states and
involves the transmission of great quantities of money, documents,
and communications across dozens of state lines. The insurance com-
panies contended that Congress did not intend in the Sherman Act to
exercise its power over the interstate insurance trade because it knew
that the Supreme Court had prior to 1890 said that insurance was
not commerce. The Court answered this by pointing out that there
was no exemption for insurance companies in the Act and that the
Congress of 1890 also knew that railroads were subject to regulation
not only by the states but by the Federal Government itself, but this
fact has been held insufficient to bring to the railroad companies the
interpretative exemption from the Sherman Act they have sought.8
Congress used language broad enough to include all businesses and
therefore the business of insurance is covered by the Act. The final
argument of the defendant was that competition in the field of insur-
ance is detrimental to both the insurers and the insured. It was the
view of the Court that whether competition was a good thing for the
insurance business was not for it to decide; if any exemptions are to
be written into the Act, they must come from Congress. In discuss-
ing the effect of this decision on the various state laws regulating
insurance the Court pointed out that in the absence of conflicting
Congressional action, the state regulatory and tax laws should be
declared valid. But the question still remains as to how much the
Federal Government will regulate and what effect will the regulation
have ?
H. F. McN.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT DOCTRINE--
EXTRA-TERRITORIAL VALIDITY OF DIvoRcES.-The petitioner, Sonia
Jordi, was married in 1925 to Homer D. Lindgren, who was then a
faculty member of a university in New York City where he continued
to serve until his death in 1942. After the birth of the daughter,
Gloria, in 1926, the decedent and his wife lived apart under a formal
separation agreement. On October 3, 1939, the decedent was granted
an absolute divorce by the Circuit Court of Florida upon grounds not
recognized in this state. Two days later, he was married to present
appellant, Gladys McDermaid Lindgren. Petitioner did not appear
in court in the divorce action, but later, upon ground of mistake of
counsel, she procured an order which purported to amend the divorce
decree to include her appearance and consent to the final decree. Two
months later, and before the death of the decedent, she married Paul
Jordi. The courts below have granted petitioner letters of adminis-
tration upon the estate of Homer D. Lindgren, decedent, not as his
former wife, but because she is the guardian of the only child of that
8 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U. S. 290, 17 Sup.
Ct. 540 (1896).
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marriage, who claims to be the sole distributee of the decedent's
estate (Surrogate's Ct. Act § 118). Held, affirmed. The court held
this divorce invalid as to the child, a third party, because the surro-
gate found, as a matter of fact, that the decedent did not comply with
the Florida residence requirement,' and also that under those circum-
stances the courts of this state did not violate the full faith and credit
clause in refusing to give effect to the Florida divorce decree of 1939.2
Matter of Lindgren, 293 N. Y. 18, 55 N. E. (2d) 849 (1944).
That a state, in giving full faith and credit to judicial proceedings
of a sister state, may determine whether the sister state's residence
requirements for divorce have been complied with was conceded by
dicta in a leading U. S. Supreme Court case.3 A New York court,
in a later decision,4 availed itself of this opening in the Williams case,
declaring a Nevada divorce decree invalid because the parties had not
met the residence requirements. The Court of Appeals, however,
has not, until this decision, gone that far. It rested its decision in
the Matter of Holmes 5 squarely upon the Williams case, giving full
force and effect to the divorce decree until impeached by evidence
which establishes that the court had no jurisdiction over the res. In
the principal case, the surrogate has found the evidence necessary to
impeach the foreign decree, and New York's highest court has taken
the step which the U. S. Supreme Court, though it pointed the way,
has so far refused to take.
I. G. McN.
FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT-DISABILITY RESULTING
FROM INHALING SILICA DUST-DUTY OF RAIILROAD COMPANY TO
FURNISH SAFE PLACE TO WORK AND PROTECTIVE DEvIcEs.-Plain-
tiff, an employee of defendant, brought suit for personal injuries
which he claimed he sustained on August 28, 1939. He had been
continuously employed by defendant for some sixteen years as an
engine service man. Among his other duties, he was required to
prepare sand for use in the locomotive sand boxes, during which oper-
ation clouds of silica dust were raised. The plaintiff was furnished
no protection such as a mask against the inhalation of the dust, nor
1 F. S. A. § 65.02 provides that "In order to obtain a divorce, the com-
plainant must have resided ninety days in the State of Florida before the filing
of the bill of complaint." The requirement as to residence has been construed
by the Florida courts to mean domicile as distinguished from a mere residence
in the state. Taylor v. Taylor, 132 Fla. 690, 182 So. 238 (1938).
2 Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14, 23 Sup. Ct. 237 (1903).
3 North Carolina v. Williams, 317 U. S. 287, 63 Sup. Ct. 207 (1942). This
decision forced the North Carolina authorities to give full faith and credit to
the Nevada decree, but "assumed that petitioners had a bona fide domicile in
Nevada, and not that the Nevada domicile was a sham."4 Ammermuller v. Ammermuller, 181 Misc. 98, 45 N. Y. S. (2d) 654
(1943).
5 Matter of Holmes, 291 N. Y. 261, 54 N. E. (2d) 424 (1943).
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